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Abstract: Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the much-
debated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant’s argument from his affirmation that we all have a price – we 
can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, 
our reason can always be overpowered by sensible inclinations. Kant moreover holds that this necessary feature of 
our moral psychology should not have been the case: We ought to instead be like the divine human being, for whom 
the moral law yields a greater incentive than any possible temptation. On Kant’s view, we are thus responsible for 
having a price, and the synthetic a priori fact that we do proves that we each made an initial choice of evil. 
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1. Introduction 
Kant’s Religion famously claims that all natural human beings are initially evil. Kant seemingly 
thinks this follows from the truth of the saying “every man has his price, for which he sells 
himself” (RGV, 6:38-39). However, interpreters struggling with Kant’s puzzling doctrine of 
universal evil have hitherto not found this saying helpful. Why must every man have his price? 
And how could we know? Even the “member of the English parliament” (RGV, 6:38) to whom 
Kant ascribes the saying presents it as a generalization concerning most men rather than a 
universal, a priori truth: “It is an old maxim, that every man has his price, if you can but come up 
to it: this, I hope, does not hold true of every man, but I am afraid it too generally holds true; and 
that of a great many it may hold true, is what I believe was never doubted of.”1 
 
1 Sir William Wyndham, speech to the House, March 13, 1734; quoted in Coxe (1798: 415). The Cambridge 
Translation of Kant’s Religion instead refers the saying to Sir Robert Walpole, the English Prime Minister at the 
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This article argues that, initial appearances aside, the saying “every man has his price” – when 
properly understood – forms the basis of a novel and plausible reconstruction of the Kantian 
argument. This argument amounts to a synthetic a priori proof that all human beings within 
possible experience begin from freely chosen evil. Readings of Kant’s doctrine of radical evil 
traditionally divide into two groups: “Empirical” interpretations take Kant’s claim to be based on 
empirical generalization and deny that there is a formal proof;2 “a priori” interpretations propose 
synthetic a priori proofs of universal radical evil on Kant’s behalf.3 My interpretation belongs to 
the latter group: We can infer from the necessary conditions of possible experience that every 
man has his price.4 Unlike extant proposals, I identify a specific synthetic a priori cognition from 
KrV on which the argument rests. 
Kant’s endorsement of the saying “every man has his price” reflects neither a dubious empirical 
psychology, nor an equally dubious claim about our free will’s susceptibility to monetary 
temptation (which would then not be true freedom at all). Rather, it reflects the essential nature 
of the finite causal powers of the mind (Gemüthskräfte). These powers fall under a synthetic a 
priori principle Kant argues for in the Critique of Pure Reason: that every empirical reality has a 
finite degree, an intensive magnitude. Applied to the empirical powers of the mind, this principle 
brings out the underlying truth of “every man has his price,” namely what I call Possible 
Overpowering (PO): When it comes to our empirical ability to choose between different courses 
of action (our Willkür as phenomenon), the degree of influence exerted by reason can always be 
 
time, who in fact made a slightly different claim several years later, that “[a]ll those men [referring to “certain 
patriots”] have their price.” Nonetheless, the saying has since been commonly (mis)attributed to him. Which of these 
Kant had in mind is unclear – in any case, neither version of the claim has universal scope.  
2 See Frierson (2003), Grenberg (2005), Louden (2009), Quinn (1988); they disagree on the extent to which this 
empirical generalization is justified. 
3 See Allison (1990), Palmquist (2008), Morgan (2005), Papish (2018), Muchnik (2009) (although Muchnik labels 
his argument as “hybrid,” incorporating empirical elements), and Formosa (2007) (although Formosa thinks Kant’s 
argument fails).  
4 One could add a third group of “subjective” interpretations: whereas the two other groups adduce objective (a 
priori or empirical) grounds for universal radical evil, this third group holds that universal radical evil is affirmed on 
subjective – but nonetheless universal – grounds. They may for instance hold that it is a teleological claim about 
human biology, psychology, or culture; or a necessary regulative claim on moral grounds.  See Anderson-Gold 
(1991), Wood (1991) and (1999), Grimm (2002), Kemp (2011), Serck-Hanssen (2012), Kohl (forthcoming).  
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overpowered by the degree of influence exerted by sensibility. Kant sees this as ineluctable for 
all natural human beings, who can therefore always be influenced by sensibility to immoral 
action: the “subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral 
law (…) belongs to the human being universally” (RGV, 6:29). 
PO is a synthetic a priori cognition concerning human psychology, independent of empirical 
premises or generalization. Kant’s affirmation of universal radical evil follows if we are 
responsible for PO. I will show that this is indeed Kant’s view. Our empirical powers, and PO as 
a feature of how these powers relate, belong to our empirical character, which on Kant’s view 
has our freely chosen intelligible character as its “transcendental cause” (KrV, A546/B574). We 
are responsible for the causality of our intelligible character and hence for PO. Our powers 
should instead relate in a way that we can think (but not experience), namely like in the divine 
human being (göttlich gesinnter Mensch) for whom PO does not hold. We can reject evil and 
strive towards this ideal by influencing our empirical powers in the right direction – towards 
virtue, the “moral strength of a human being’s will” (MS, 6:405). But as natural human beings, 
we remain infinitely removed from the ideal (see RGV, 6:66), since our moral strength – within 
experience – must remain finite in degree. We will always have a price. 
Some caveats: First, Kant famously does not himself provide an a priori argument. As often 
quoted, with varying degrees of frustration, Kant holds that we can “spare ourselves the formal 
proof that there must be such a corrupt propensity rooted in the human being, in view of the 
multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades before us” (RGV, 
6:32-33).5 My proposal is thus a reconstruction. Kant’s phrasing does suggest that there is a 
formal proof available (cf. Grimm 2002: 164-165),6 and if my proposal is correct the lack of 
proof is explained by Kant’s expressed intention in the Religion not to require knowledge of the 
theoretical principles of KrV from its readers. I hope further to make plausible that the “every 
man has his price” saying, and other passages considered below, gesture towards the proposed 
argument. Second, my ambition is only to provide a plausible reconstruction of Kant’s reasoning 
 
5 Already a year after its publication, Eberhard (1794: 41-42) targeted this lack of proof in Kant’s Religion; see 
further Louden (2009: 109-110). 
6 Kant later states: “Of the evil that lies in the human heart and of which nobody is free (…) everyone can be 
convinced through his reason” (RGV, 6:163, my italics). 
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– defending its independent philosophical plausibility is beyond my scope. Third, I assume from 
the outset that Kant’s talk of powers of the mind is legitimate, and specifically, that he justifiably 
appeals to empirical mental powers. Defending this surprisingly controversial assumption would 
take us too far afield (for discussion see Frierson 2014). I use it to develop a novel reconstruction 
of Kant’s argument for universal radical evil; indirectly, success at this task supports the 
assumption by showing its fruitfulness. 
 
2. Human Predispositions and Power of Choice 
This section and the next aims to gradually introduce the premises underlying the “every man 
has his price” saying, beginning from a weak, analytic assumption concerning the constitution of 
the human mind, and moving incrementally towards stronger, more controversial, and synthetic 
assumptions needed for universal radical evil to follow. This approach helps pinpoint the role of 
the synthetic a priori premise I attribute to Kant’s argument and distinguish it from analytic 
claims. Moreover, previous commentators have held weaker assumptions to be sufficient 
grounds for Kant’s claim of universal evil; explaining their insufficiency positions my 
reconstruction within the existing literature. 
Kant famously holds that human beings have an essentially composite nature, comprising a 
sensuous and a rational side: 
 Composite: Human beings have two distinct faculties, namely sensibility and reason. 
This distinguishes us from beings with intellectual intuition – from the intuitive intellect of God; 
and from animals lacking rationality, whose power of choice is necessitated by sensible 
inclinations alone (V-Met-L2/Pölitz, 28:588; V-Met/Arnoldt, 29:1015; V-Mo/Mron II, 29:611). 
On occasion, Henry Allison’s influential reading appears to infer universal radical evil directly 
from Composite: He interprets Kant’s contrast between human beings and beings with a “holy 
will” as a contrast between “a will (or agent) [that] is not sensuously affected” and “finite, 
sensuously affected rational beings such as ourselves” (Allison 1990: 156). This may be taken to 
mean that by having sensibility, human beings are ipso facto subject to temptation, which Allison 
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takes to imply radical evil.7 However, Allison plausibly intends something more than Composite 
by the term “sensuously affected,” namely a sensible influence specifically on our choice, 
Willkür. There could be creatures whose sensibility did not exert any potentially immoral 
influence on their choice: “finite holy beings” (MS, 6:383) may constitute an example.8 Such 
angelic beings would regard sensibility merely as a source of information, utilised by reason in 
determining how to act. However, sensibility would not be a separate source of desires or 
inclinations. A slightly stronger assumption might therefore better capture Allison’s intention: 
Potential Conflict: Human beings have two potentially conflicting influences on their 
choice (Willkür), namely sensibility and reason. 
We face not just distinct faculties but a potential clash between sensible inclinations and moral 
demands of reason. For Kant, Potential Conflict distinguishes human beings from “finite holy 
beings (who could never be tempted to violate duty)” (MS, 6:383). Human Willkür is “affected, 
but not [completely] determined” by sensible impulses (MS, 6:214; cf. KrV, A534/B562; V-
Met/Dohna, 28:677). Our actions are “in great part occasioned but not completely determined by 
sensibility” (Refl 5611, 18:252); complementarily, we are not creatures that necessarily comply 
with oughts, as we would be “if reason completely determined the will” (KpV, 5:20). 
What is the status of Potential Conflict? Textual evidence suggests that Kant sees it as an 
analytic claim about human beings. Consider the Religion’s account of the three “predispositions 
(…) that relate immediately to the faculty of desire and the exercise of the power of choice 
[Gebrauch der Willkür]” (RGV, 6:28): One is the “predisposition to animality” (RGV, 6:26), 
another the “predisposition to personality” (RGV, 6:27) – simplifying somewhat these indicate 
the influence of sensibility and of reason, respectively, on the power of choice. Both of them are 
for Kant “original, for they belong to the possibility of human nature” (RGV, 6:28). 
Predispositions are original if “they belong with necessity to the possibility of this being, (…) 
[whereas they are] contingent if the being in question is possible in itself also without them” 
 
7 Wood’s criticism of Allison for turning evil into a “trivial practical corollary of our finitude” (1999: 287) seems to 
interpret Allison in this way. 
8 Early lecture notes indicate that Kant has angels in mind, cf. V-PP/Herder, 27:13. (Occasionally, lecture notes 
report Kant as denying that finite holy beings are possible, cf. V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, 28:1113. However, this is unlikely 
to be his considered view.) 
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(RGV, 6:28). If a human being without these predispositions is not “possible in itself” (not just 
within possible experience), they must belong analytically to the concept of a human being.9 
Is Potential Conflict enough to qualify as evil? Here, I part way with several interpreters in 
holding that it is not.10 I reason as follows: Potential Conflict does not guarantee both conflicting 
parties potential victory. One can conceive of a being for whom Potential Conflict holds, but 
where reason (or sensibility) always, and inevitably, has the upper hand in cases of conflict. In 
fact, Kant himself describes such a being: the divine human being characterized in the Religion 
(6:60ff.). This being is “afflicted by just the same needs and hence also the same sufferings, by 
just the same natural inclinations and hence also the same temptations to transgression, as we 
are” (RGV, 6:64, see also 6:61), and thus encumbered with Potential Conflict.11 Yet, crucially, 
the divine human being is nonetheless “free from innate propensity to evil” (RGV, 6:80n.).12 
In the divine human being, Potential Conflict coexists with a premise ala ‘Necessary 
Overpowering: Reason necessarily overpowers sensibility in cases where their influences on 
Willkür conflict.’13 All temptations are thereby resisted. Radical evil entails that “pleasure can 
induce them to break the moral law, even though they recognize its authority” (MS, 6:379). 
Since Potential Conflict combined with Necessary Overpowering makes this impossible, 
 
9 See also: “The human being has many instincts belonging to animality, and (…) has to have them if he is to 
continue being human” (V-Phil-Th/Pölitz, 28:1078). 
10 Against for instance Allison (1990); Grimm (2002), who seems to read Potential Conflict as a teleological, rather 
than analytic, claim about human nature that suffices for radical evil; and Caswell, who claims that “temptations to 
immorality” (Caswell 2006: 202) suffices for evil. 
11 Baxley (2010: 55-56) assumes that the divine human being is a finite holy will. However, in subjecting itself to 
Potential Conflict, it divests itself of an aspect of this holiness: “[W]e represent to ourselves this God-like human 
being, our prototype, in such a way that, though himself holy and hence not bound to submit to sufferings, he 
nonetheless takes these upon himself in the fullest measure for the sake of promoting the world's greatest good” 
(RGV, 6:61, my emphasis). In becoming human, the divine being brings suffering and temptation (incompatible 
with holiness as such) upon itself “for the sake of promoting the world's greatest good.” 
12 Some interpreters dispute this; for discussion see footnote 24 below. 
13 Flew (1962) independently emphasizes the distinction I find in Kant between having no temptations (finite holy 
wills) and having temptations but necessarily overcoming them (the divine human being). 
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Potential Conflict by itself is insufficient for radical evil.14 If I am right that Kant sees Potential 
Conflict as analytic, this is no surprise: Kant is clear that universal radical evil is not an analytic 
claim (RGV, 6:29, 6:32). Further indication that Potential Conflict is insufficient for radical evil 
is found in Kant’s insistence that the mere presence of sensible inclinations that conflict with 
demands of morality is not evil:  
The ground of this evil cannot (…) be placed, as is commonly done, in the sensuous 
nature of the human being, and in the natural inclinations originating from it. For not only 
do these bear no direct relation to evil (they rather give the occasion for what the moral 
disposition can demonstrate in its power, for virtue): we also cannot presume ourselves 
responsible for their existence (we cannot because, as conatural to us, natural inclinations 
do not have us as their author), though we can well be responsible for the propensity to 
evil (RGV, 6:34f.). 
This passage confirms both points already made: First, that Potential Conflict is not sufficient for 
evil because it could be merely the occasion for demonstrating the power of the moral 
disposition, i.e., it does not guarantee the potential victory of sensible inclinations over moral 
demands; second, that Potential Conflict, as “conatural to us,” pertains analytically to human 
beings and thus cannot be something we are responsible for. At this point we must therefore ask: 
Is there a synthetic a priori judgment that we can add in order to reach evil, i.e., a claim that 
would establish the human condition within experience as one where sensibility might win out 
over reason in cases of conflict? 
 
 
3. Degrees of Power 
 
14 Doesn’t our freedom rule out Necessary Overpowering, and thereby suffice, together with Potential Conflict, for 
radical evil? The suggestion is that Potential Conflict, plus the premise that we are free to choose either side of the 
conflict, entails that we can always be tempted to actually do evil. Therefore, the victory of sensibility over reason in 
cases of conflict is a real and inextirpable possibility. Against this suggestion, Kantian universal radical evil is not 
merely the possibility of freely choosing evil, but the much stronger thesis that all natural human beings have in fact 
made an initial choice to subordinate morality to sensibility (see RGV, 6:43). The divine human being has not made 
this initial choice, despite being both free and subjected to Potential Conflict. 
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I propose a novel candidate for the synthetic a priori basis for universal radical evil, namely the 
principle of the Anticipations of Perception in KrV: “In all appearances the real, which is an 
object of the sensation, has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree” (B207). “The real” here means 
the positive, non-trivial, and non-geometrical properties of appearances that Kant calls their 
realities.15 Without going into the intricacies of the principle and Kant’s justification of it in KrV, 
the following point shows why the principle is relevant to radical evil: the two conflicting 
influences on our Willkür – sensibility and reason – are realities, positive properties of ourselves 
as inner objects of experience, and therefore have degrees. We thus get the following premise: 
Conflict of Finite Powers: Natural human beings have two potentially conflicting powers 
with finite degrees influencing choice (Willkür), namely sensibility and reason. 
This adds to Potential Conflict the idea that these conflicting influences on Willkür are, so to 
speak, on the same playing field: they both have a finite, quantifiable impact.16 A synthetic a 
priori element thereby supplements the analytic claims. Our powers having a finite degree is not 
contained analytically in the concept of a human being, but, given the KrV’s principle of 
intensive magnitude, is nonetheless inevitably the case within experience. 
Reading sensibility and reason as empirical realities is well supported by textual evidence. At 
one point Kant specifically ascribes to all the different faculties of the mind a “degree of reality”: 
“[O]ne (…) cannot deny to [the soul as object of inner sense], any more than to any other 
existence, an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties, indeed to 
everything in general that constitutes its existence” (KrV, B414; see MAN, 4:542; V-Met/Mron, 
29:905f., 29:912f.; V-Met-K2/Heinze, 28:761, 28:763f.; V-Met/Arnoldt, 29:1037; Refl 5650, 
18:299; VNAEF, 8:413). Sensibility is said to have a “determinate degree of receptivity” (KrV, 
A172/B214), and “[i]mpulses of nature, accordingly, involve obstacles within the human being’s 
mind to his fulfillment of duty and (sometimes powerful [mächtige]) forces [Kräfte] opposing it” 
(MS, 6:379f.). Even reason, the faculty Kant interpreters perhaps most hesitate to ‘naturalize’ as 
 
15 For more on Kant’s conception of reality and its relation to causal power, see Warren (2001: ch. 1); Giovanelli 
(2011). Kant’s argument for the principle is defended in Jankowiak (2013). 
16 The divine human being’s reason does not have a finite degree in this sense (Kant describes it as a “maximum” 
(V-Mo/Mron II, 29:604f.)). This reflects the well-known conception of the divine as having certain positive 
properties fully or infinitely, whereas we have them to a finite, limited degree (KpV, 5:131n.). See further below. 
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an empirical causal power, is characterized by Kant as having empirical causality. We should 
consider empirical reason more closely, since reason is not merely an empirical power: 
A human being really finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes himself from 
all other things, even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects, and that is reason. 
(…) Because of this a rational being must regard himself as intelligence (hence not from 
the side of his lower powers) as belonging not to the world of sense but to the world of 
understanding (GMS, 4:452; see KrV, A546/B574f.). 
Given its importance for his moral philosophy, Kant mostly emphasizes this intelligible aspect of 
our reason. However, there are clear indications that reason is also an empirical power: “We 
have in us a faculty that not only stands in connection with its subjectively determining grounds, 
which are the natural causes of its actions – and thus far is the faculty of a being which itself 
belongs to appearances – but that is also related to objective grounds that are mere ideas, insofar 
as these ideas can determine this faculty, a connection that is expressed by ought. This faculty is 
called reason” (Prol, 4:344-5, first emphasis mine). In KrV, Kant states that “even though it is 
reason, it must nevertheless exhibit an empirical character” (A549/B577) and that we “cognize 
practical freedom through experience, as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason 
in the determination of the will” (A803/B831; see MS, 6:418). Elsewhere he reportedly says that 
“even [one’s] reason, as subjected to the laws of nature, can be considered devoid of all 
freedom” (V-MS/Vigil, 27:502). Systematically, empirical psychology’s investigation of actual 
human representation, thought, and action cannot plausibly leave out the effects of reason – and 
indeed, Kant’s empirical discussions of mental faculties always include reason.17 
Returning to Conflict of Finite Powers, it helps explain what so many commentators have found 
intolerable about Kant’s Religion: The idea that Kant has a formal proof of universal radical evil 
available, yet declines to offer it. Why not present the proof and (with the 20/20 characteristic of 
hindsight) spare us centuries of inconclusive speculation and labor? However, Kant explicitly 
intends the Religion not to invoke the complicated theoretical argumentation of the KrV: “[O]nly 
 
17 The “higher powers,” including reason, are a staple of discussion in Kant’s empirical psychology and 
anthropology, see e.g. Anth, 7:196f.; V-Met/Herder, 28:863-865; V-Met/Mron, 29:888-890; V-Anth/Pillau, 
25:773f.; V-Anth/Mensch, 25:1032f.; V-Anth/Mron, 25:1296; V-Anth/Busolt, 25:1476; see further Frierson (2005: 
14, 23f.; 2014: 7-8), Kain (2003: 235). For more on reason as a natural cause, see Rauscher (2006), (2015: 114f.). 
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common morality is needed to understand the essentials of this text, without venturing into the 
critique of practical reason, still less into that of theoretical reason” (RGV, 6:14). Hence it is 
unsuited for a formal proof based on one of KrV’s First Principles of Pure Understanding, 
explicating its consequences within Kant’s overall theory of human powers and faculty of desire. 
One may still disapprove of Kant’s pedagogical choice here, of course. This reading at least has 
him proceeding consistently with his expressed intentions, rather than haphazardly neglecting to 
give (or gesturing towards without actually having) what seems like a crucial proof. As far as I 
can tell, this explanation is not available to other extant a priori interpretations of the universality 
of evil, since they do not appeal to specific critical principles ‘of theoretical reason’. 
Conflict of Finite Powers is not enough for inferring universal radical evil. Radical evil entails 
that sensibility might win out over reason in cases where their influence on our Willkür conflict. 
Even given Conflict of Finite Powers, one power might inevitably overpower the other – as, say, 
the finite number 10 is always greater than the finite number 5. A further premise must be added: 
Changeability: The strength of one’s powers is subject to possible change over time. 
On Kant’s view, our empirical powers may change over time (see further Indregard 2018). Kant 
considers Changeability a corollary to the principle of the Anticipations of Perception: In 
explicating the principle he states that “every reality in appearance, however small it may be, has 
a degree, i.e., an intensive magnitude, which can still always be diminished” (KrV, A169/B211, 
my emphasis), “every reality has its degree that can decrease to nothing” (KrV, A172-
173/B214), and again, “everything real has for the same quality its degree (…) [which] can 
become infinitely smaller until it is transformed into emptiness and disappears” (KrV, 
A174/B216).18 Kant uses this point specifically with respect to empirical mental powers in the 
Paralogisms, in arguing that the soul cannot be shown to be a substance: 
 
18 Some read these passages as making a merely phenomenological claim about the possibility of imagining change 
in degree (see e.g. Buroker 2006: 152f.), without implying the real possibility of change in degree of reality. 
However, admitting “imagined possibility” – as something more than logical, yet less than real possibility – is 
controversial (Stang (2016) counts only real and logical possibility among Kant’s main concepts of possibility, see 
e.g. the figure on (2016: 271)). Moreover, passages I cite in what follows, for instance concerning the duty to 
strengthen and develop one’s powers, clearly require real and not merely imagined possibility of change in degree.  
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[O]ne (…) cannot deny to [the soul], any more than to any other existence, an intensive 
magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties, which might diminish 
through all the infinitely many smaller degrees (…) [T]he supposed substance (the thing 
whose persistence has not otherwise been established already) could be transformed into 
nothing, although not by disintegration, but by a gradual remission (remissio) of all its 
powers (KrV, B414-415; cf. MAN, 4:542; V-Met/Mron, 29:905f., 29:912f.; V-Met-
K2/Heinze, 28:761, 28:763f.; V-Met/Arnoldt, 29:1037; Refl 5650, 18:299). 
Kant thus takes the Anticipations of Perception principle to imply that the degree of strength of 
one’s powers can change over time. We rediscover this throughout Kant’s philosophy: Kant 
repeatedly encourages changing, for moral purposes, the strength of one’s powers, referring to 
“the duty of man to develop his powers quoad maxime” (V-MS/Vigil, 27:625f.; see also Päd, 
9:472ff.) and gradually acquiring virtue as “moral strength” (MS, 6:405).19 This may involve 
combatting the “weakness in the use of one’s understanding” (MS, 6:408; cf. Anth, 7:253) or “to 
cultivate [moral feeling] and to strengthen it” (MS, 6:399-400).20 Conversely, Kant allows for the 
weakening of one’s reason: “[T]he basis of great crimes is merely the force of inclinations that 
weaken reason” (MS, 6:384, emphasis in original). Kant’s account of aesthetic experience also 
refers to changes in strength of mental powers: perceiving beauty brings “a consciousness of the 
harmony of our powers of representation (…) in which we feel our entire cognitive faculty 
(understanding and imagination) strengthened” (KpV, 5:160; see KU, 5:313, 5:366). 
Conflict of Finite Powers, together with Changeability, plausibly suffices to get us the claim 
underlying Kant’s thesis of radical evil, namely that it is always possible for our sensibility to 
win out over the demands of morality in cases of conflict. Before concluding this section, I will 
briefly discuss another premise that also seems crucial for Kant’s moral psychology, although its 
precise relation to the proof of radical evil is not quite clear: 
 
19 The Anthropology states that “the wisdom of nature has planted in us the predisposition to compassion in order to 
handle the reins provisionally, until reason has achieved the necessary strength” (Anth, 7:253). 
20 I here simplify Kant’s view by conceiving sensibility and reason merely as two potentially opposed powers 
influencing our Willkür. As the idea of cultivating moral feeling indicates, the actual relation between them is 
considerably more complex, and Kant does not advocate a view of virtue on which it simply means suppressing 
one’s sensibility and strengthening one’s reason. For our purposes these complications can be set aside. 
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Modulation: The strength of sensibility’s influence on our Willkür changes with the 
nature of the external influences on sensibility, e.g., with the strength of the affection of 
sensibility. 
The input sensibility receives makes a difference to the strength of its influence on our Willkür. 
We must countenance not only the strength of sensibility itself, as a power, but also the strength 
of its various inputs. The influence of sensibility on our choice differs depending on whether it is 
affected by something moderately tempting (say, a piece of fruit) or something we find 
practically irresistible (say, a delicious piece of cake). The idea behind Modulation is something 
like this: we can conceive of the strength of the influence on choice as the strength of the input 
multiplied by the strength of the power of sensibility. Of course, this is a simplification – the 
details will vary depending on empirical factors and do not matter for my purposes. 
An interesting result would arise if we could add to Modulation that the strength of the input (the 
impression made on sensibility) is positively, non-asymptotically correlated with the strength of 
sensibility’s influence on Willkür. We could then infer that no matter how weak one’s sensibility, 
and no matter how strong one’s reason, there is always a possible input to one’s sensibility of 
such strength that it ‘modulates’ sensibility to overpower reason’s influence on Willkür. If the 
cake smells sufficiently delicious, or the pain is sufficiently excruciating, even the most stalwart 
and stoic of us would succumb to temptation. This begins to sound a lot like Kant’s suggestion: 
“Every man has his price, for which he sells himself” (RGV, 6:38-39). 
Strengthened in this way, Modulation and Conflict of Finite Powers suffice, even without 
Changeability, to ground Kant’s argument for radical evil – entailing that every man indeed has 
his price. However, there is a problem: The strengthened version of Modulation is not plausibly a 
priori. It does not appear derivable from the Anticipations of Perception, nor from additional a 
priori (synthetic or analytic) claims. The correlation being non-asymptotic seems particularly 
difficult to justify a priori (or even empirically, for that matter). It is conceivable that Kant (if 
strengthened Modulation plays a role in the “formal proof” he had in mind) simply did not 
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consider the possibility of an asymptotic correlation.21 However, it seems preferable not to give 
strengthened Modulation an essential role in Kant’s proof. 
With Changeability, however, even non-strengthened Modulation can ground the radical evil 
thesis. Together, they entail that there is a possible degree of strength of input on one’s 
sensibility, and a possible degree of strength/weakness of one’s empirical powers of reason and 
sensibility, so that sensibility exerts a stronger influence than reason on one’s Willkür. For given 
Changeability and Modulation, no starting point can rule out that the strength of one’s powers 
and sensible input might change so as to actualize this possibility in the future. A basis for 
universal radical evil, and the underlying truth of the “every man has his price” saying, follows: 
Possible Overpowering (PO): The degree of influence exerted by reason on our empirical 
Willkür can be overpowered by the degree of influence exerted by sensibility. 
 Given Changeability, PO is not falsified even if one’s sensibility cannot currently overpower 
one’s reason (perhaps because one’s reason is strong and sensibility’s influence is only 
asymptotically strengthened by the strength of its inputs), since this may change over time.  
PO indicates that frailty – the possibility of being overcome by temptation, even if one has 
revolutionized one’s disposition and attained a good will – is the most fundamental human 
weakness, and the inescapable signal of our initial evil disposition.22 This safeguards Kant’s 
 
21 This worry about asymptotes arguably underlies a natural skepticism towards Kant’s “every man has his price” 
claim: Sure we can be tempted by pains or gains, and the greater the pain or gain the greater the temptation. 
However, there are diminishing returns and eventually further increase is irrelevant – if there are things one will not 
do for a billion dollars, an additional billion will presumably not matter. The Changeability premise allows us to 
accept this point and nonetheless affirm universal radical evil. 
22 Frailty is the lowest of the three grades of evil recounted by Kant (RGV, 6:29f.). On my account, it inextricably 
pertains to all natural human beings, whereas impurity can be, and depravity necessarily is, avoided in the aftermath 
of a “revolution (…) in the mode of thought” (RGV, 6:47). I read frailty as encompassing not just actual instances 
of weakness of will, but also the empirical character in which the potential for weakness of will is present. I thus 
disagree with Hare’s claim that “frailty is where the inclination is not only present (because we are finite) but 
subjectively stronger than the good will” (2013: 308); frailty as the “general weakness of the human heart in 
complying with the adopted maxims” (RGV, 6:29) refers to a general condition rather than specific instances, 
plausibly the condition opposed to virtue as moral strength. Since perfect virtue is unattainable within experience, 
frailty is inescapable. See further McCarty (2009: ch. 7). 
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thesis from an implausible quasi-empirical consequence often attributed to it: We need not say 
that all human beings have freely chosen to perform immoral deeds. One could find saint-like 
human beings, whose perceivable deeds provide no grounds for suspecting depravity, or even 
impurity, of heart. Their actions all seem to stem from mere respect for the moral law – of 
course, this cannot be known due to opacity, but a situation is possible where no evidence 
suggests otherwise. Kant is committed to a merely counterfactual claim: You are a priori 
theoretically justified not in holding that all human beings have sold themselves (given in to 
temptation), but that even the best, most saint-like human beings have a price for which they 
would sell themselves, i.e., possible sensuous inclinations of such strength as to overpower their 
rational wills.23 As Kant suggests: “[N]owhere is a virtue which no level of temptation can 
overthrow” (RGV, 6:38f., my emphasis; cf. V-Mo/Collins, 27:434). Regardless of whether the 
possibility is ever actualized, the mere possibility already signals an initial evil disposition, a 
radical evil that can never (within experience) be fully extirpated, even by attaining a good will. 
This renders transcendent to theoretical cognition our concept of a divine (rather than natural) 
human being: the “elevation of such a Holy One above every frailty of human nature” (RGV, 
6:64).24 As Kant reportedly says in one of his lectures: “The ideal is the prototypon of morality. 
 
23 As implied by the question: “How many people who have lived long and guiltless lives may be merely fortunate 
in having escaped so many temptations?” (MS, 6:392f.; cf. V-Mo/Collins, 27:434).  
24 The section in question invites a potential objection to my reading: Kant seems to say that we should not elevate 
the divine human being above frailty, as this would “stand in the way of the practical adoption of the idea of such a 
being for our imitation” (RGV, 6:64). Thus, frailty (Palmquist 2012: 427; Pasternack 2015: 497), and even radical 
evil (Palmquist 2012: 428-9), must be ascribed also to the divine human being. My reply: This section of the 
Religion concerns the “objective reality” (RGV, 6:62) of the idea of a divine human being, an objective reality Kant 
first claims is evident “from the practical point of view” (RGV, 6:62, my italics). He then discusses problems 
associated with ascribing objective reality to it from a theoretical point of view. Conceived as theoretical cognition, 
a denial of frailty is illegitimate and practically unfortunate. The paragraph ends with an important footnote 
distinguishing the “schematism of analogy” from the “schematism of object-determination,” which “from the moral 
point of view (in religion) (…) has most injurious consequences” (RGV, 6:65n.). Kant’s point is not to theoretically 
ascribe frailty to the divine human being; the error lies in conceiving the divine human being through a “schematism 
of object-determination” at all, whether we thereby affirm (from principles of experience) or deny (from speculative 
reason) frailty. We can thus take at face value Kant’s characterizations of the divine human being as not subject to 
weakness (V-Mo/Mron II, 29:606), and as “a person free from innate propensity to evil” (RGV, 6:80n., cf. 6:80) – 
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A natural man can never be the ideal, for he is still always subject to weakness” (V-Mo/Mron II, 
29:605). 
 
4. Culpability and Empirical Character 
Readers familiar with the major interpretative strands on Kant’s practical philosophy have 
probably noticed that I advocate a so-called ‘battle of forces’ model of empirical choice.25 
Actions are empirically determined by the relative strength of the two powers influencing choice 
– reason and sensibility. Many Kant interpreters reject such an account as incompatible with 
Kant’s theory of freedom and rationality.26 Let me therefore first point out that my concern has 
been the empirical power of choice, our “choice [Willkür] as a phenomenon” (MS, 6:226; cf. 
KrV, A549/B577, A552/B580; V-Met/Arnoldt, 29:1015). Although it is denied by some 
commentators,27 there is strong textual evidence that Kant is committed to empirical determinism 
not just in the physical but also in the mental realm.28 Such determinism coheres well with a 
‘battle of forces’ account on the empirical level, especially if one takes on board the recent 
revaluation of Kant’s theory of causality convincingly proposed by Watkins (2005), where 
causal powers take center stage. And as I will go on to argue, a ‘battle of forces’ account of 
empirical choice is in fact uniquely well-suited to accommodate Kant’s theory of freedom. 
The idea is as follows: Kant’s account of noumenal freedom fits his account of an empirical 
battle of forces, if free agency is conceived as a capacity to influence the battling forces – and 
thereby also the outcome. Along lines recently proposed within contemporary philosophy of 
agency by Brian Ellis, Kantian freedom is a “meta-causal power,” the “power we have to modify 
 
from a practical point of view. Similarly, while the Paralogisms argue against ascribing immortality to the soul on 
theoretical grounds, we must nonetheless ascribe immortality to our soul on practical grounds. 
25 Proponents of similar views include Frierson (2014); McCarty (2009); Zinkin (2006). 
26 See Allison (1990: 164); Ameriks (2006: 8f.); Baron (2006: 25); Moran (2012: 115-116); Reath (2006: 12f.); 
Wood (1999: 33). 
27 See Gouaux (1972); Hanna (2009); Nayak and Sotnak (1995); Westphal (2004). 




our (…) causal power profiles” (Ellis 2013: 186).29 As indicated in our discussion of 
Changeability above, Kant conceives of our freedom as having such meta-causality: We exercise 
empirical causality through our empirical mental powers, but this “empirical causality itself, 
without the least interruption of its connection with natural causes, could nevertheless be an 
effect of a causality that is not empirical, but rather intelligible” (KrV, A544/B572). Empirical 
actions are, in one sense, inexorably produced by the mental powers working within us. But 
since we have the free meta-causal power to modify our empirical causality, this does not turn 
morality into “an empirically explainable natural phenomenon” (Reath 2006: 13). Rather, our 
free choice of morality – or self-love – has a real and empirically unexplainable influence on the 
phenomena, and specifically on the mental powers of the empirical subject as a natural 
phenomenon.30 One therefore has a “duty to govern oneself (…) [which] involves cultivation of 
the mental powers to those ends with which they are collectively compatible, and constitutes, 
therefore, the essential in the soul’s capacity or readiness to enlarge the facultates animi for all 
moral ends, and to direct them thereunto” (V-MS/Vigil, 27:627). Our free meta-causal power 
can, given Changeability, carry out this duty to cultivate our powers and acquire moral strength, 
i.e., virtue. By influencing and directing one’s mental powers, one freely strives towards virtue 
rather than being at the mercy of external circumstance: 
The power that the soul has over all its faculties (…) to subordinate them to its free 
choice, without being necessitated to do so, is a monarchy. If a man does not busy 
himself with this monarchy, he is a plaything of other forces [Kräfte] and impressions, 
against his choice, and is dependent upon chance and the arbitrary course of 
circumstances (V-Mo/Collins, 27:362). 
This reading gives a reasonable delimitation of one’s scope of responsibility (cf. Vilhauer 2010): 
Each person is directly responsible for his or her mental powers, how they are cultivated and 
 
29 Although Ellis does not ascribe to Kant’s transcendentally idealist framework, where the meta-causal power of 
freedom belongs to us considered as things in ourselves rather than as appearances. 
30 Crucially, causal powers – like causal laws but unlike empirical events and states of affairs – do not themselves 
require sufficient empirical causes (see Frierson 2014: 50); hence, a free capacity to influence our causal powers 
does not contradict Kant’s empirical determinism. Causal laws and causal powers of nature are on a different 
ontological level from states and events: the causal grounds that, given prior states of affairs, determine the 
subsequent states of affairs need not themselves be empirically determined. See further Indregard (2018). 
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used. However, on one point my reading does considerably extend our moral responsibility 
compared to natural expectations: Radical evil results only if our free agency is responsible for 
PO. Kant thinks that free agency could only ground PO by initially choosing an evil disposition. 
Since we know synthetically a priori that we are all subject to PO, we also know that we all 
initially chose to subordinate morality.31 But why does Kant think that we, as particular persons, 
are responsible for PO? If it is a synthetic a priori claim, why is it not an unfortunate, inevitable 
fact about human existence? I will show that PO forms part of our empirical character, and for 
Kant, we are responsible through free choice for our empirical character. 
An initial indication that we are responsible for PO is that it ought not to be valid. When 
discussing weakness of will, Kant claims that the morally good, incorporated into our maxim, is 
an “irresistible [unüberwindlich] incentive objectively” (RGV, 6:29). “Objectively” here has not 
a theoretical sense (the moral law is not in fact irresistible for us, as our weakness clearly shows), 
but a practical, normative sense: it ought to be irresistible.32 PO is incompatible with such 
irresistibility, so we can deduce that PO ought not to hold. Within experience, however, we 
cannot rid ourselves of PO, as we can only ever attain a finite degree of moral strength, i.e., 
virtue.33 We are therefore in a sense infinitely removed from how we ought to be: 
The distance between the goodness which we ought to effect in ourselves and the evil 
from which we start is, however, infinite (...). Nevertheless, the human being’s moral 
constitution ought to agree with this holiness. The latter must therefore be assumed in his 
disposition (RGV, 6:66; cf. KpV, 5:122). 
 
31 Note that Kant is not attempting to explain why we all chose evil. This is inscrutable (see Grimm 2002: 171). But 
such explanation is not (pace Grimm) supposed to be a part of Kant’s argument: Kant’s argument for universal 
radical evil is completed by pointing to (necessary) features of the world of experience that allow us to infer that we 
all chose evil. 
32 Compare Kant's references to duties as "objectively necessary" at GMS, 4:413; MS, 6:218; V-Mo/Collins, 
27:246f., 27:256; V-MS/Vigil, 27:481, 27:485f.; V-Met/Mron, 29:900; V-Met/Arnoldt, 29:1016. 
33 A lecture equates increasing virtue with increasing freedom (practical freedom to act independently of sensible 
inclinations): “The more a man considers a moral act to be irresistible, and the more he is compelled to it by duty, 




Our initial evil choice dooms our experiential existence to a causal power profile in line with PO: 
“The deficiency (…) is in principle inseparable from the existence of a temporal being, [namely] 
never being able to become fully what he has in mind” (RGV, 6:67n.). We can subsequently 
enact a moral evolution in our mode of thought and establish a good disposition, enabling 
progress towards a virtuous empirical character, through the “gradual influence that it has on the 
mind” (RGV, 6:83). It is in fact always possible to perform, from morality, the action that we 
morally ought to perform – given Changeability our reason’s strength can always be gradually 
changed to overpower a specific inclination of sensibility (cf. V-Met/Mron, 29:897). But within 
experience the evil propensity in our character cannot be fully extirpated: No gradual change in 
the strength of our mental powers, no attained finite degree of virtue, dislodges PO – the price 
may gradually increase, but there will always be a price. Hence the duty to moral perfection is a 
“narrow and perfect one in terms of its quality; but it is wide and imperfect in terms of its 
degree, because of the frailty (fragilitas) of human nature” (MS, 6:446; cf. RGV, 6:74-75n.).34 
PO is not just a coincidental, unfortunate fact about our worldly existence, like disease or natural 
disaster. As an essential yet synthetic aspect of our empirical character we are responsible for it. 
According to Kant, human beings have an empirical character:  
The human being is one of the appearances in the world of sense, and to that extent also 
one of the natural causes whose causality must stand under empirical laws. As such he 
must accordingly also have an empirical character, just like all other natural things. We 
notice it through powers and faculties which it expresses in its effects (KrV, A546/B574). 
Crucially, just prior to this Kant states that our “intelligible character (…) is the transcendental 
cause of the [empirical character]” (KrV, A546/B574); elsewhere, he similarly claims that the 
“empirical character is (…) determined in the intelligible character” (KrV, A551/B579). Our 
intelligible character determines the “law of [the empirical subject’s] causality (…) through 
which its actions, as appearances, would stand through and through in connection with other 
appearances in accordance with constant natural laws” (KrV, A539/B567; see Prol, 4:346; GMS, 
4:453). The intelligible character determines not just contingent actions but the laws of our 
 
34 Despite Kant’s ‘ought implies can’ principle, then, it is not possible (at least within experience) to fully rid oneself 
of radical evil, even though one ought to. Kant deals with various difficulties arising from this in the section 
“Difficulties That Stand in the Way of the Reality of This Idea, and Their Solution” (RGV, 6:66f.); see also 6:116f. 
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empirical agency, and the principle of intensive magnitude and PO as a synthetic first principle 
or meta-law of empirical agency thereby falls under the remit of responsibility. 
This account of our moral responsibility for PO relies heavily on Kant’s transcendental idealism. 
Specifically, it appeals to the more strongly metaphysical aspect of that doctrine, according to 
which the things in themselves ground the world of appearances. Kant understands the 
spontaneity of the subject as in some sense the author of the laws of nature in general: 
“Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances, thus to nature as the sum 
total of all appearances” (KrV, B163; cf. Prol, 4:319-320). What PO suggests is that theoretical 
reason’s authorship of the general laws of nature is already tinged by the moral – or more 
precisely, immoral – disposition instigated by one’s free power of choice.35 
This reveals a potential cost of my interpretation: Is it implausible to see (one of) the most 
fundamental principles of theoretical reason as grounded on a contingent choice of evil? Three 
points can be made in response: First, any synthetic a priori interpretation of Kant’s argument 
will say that the necessary conditions of possible experience – i.e., synthetic a priori propositions 
– imply universal radical evil. The implication is thus shared by all interpretations of this kind; 
my reconstruction merely reveals and specifies it. Second, we cannot theoretically explain why 
we have the forms of intuition and categories that we have (see KrV, B145-146). The idea that 
our free choice of intelligible character influences our theoretical principles therefore cannot be 
ruled out. Third, a strong case can be made that Kant himself draws the implication in question, 
by considering again his account of the divine human being: 
The proposed reconstruction entails that a human being unsullied by radical evil – and therefore 
not possessing a merely finite degree of rational power – cannot be cognized within the world of 
experience. This fits Kant’s account of the divine human being. A moral disposition so strong 
that it cannot be overcome by sensible inclinations, i.e., so strong that it violates PO, cannot be 
cognized theoretically: “How it is possible that the mere idea of conformity to law in general be 
an even more powerful incentive of that power [of choice] than any conceivable as deriving from 
[individual] advantages, can neither be understood by reason nor verified by examples from 
 
35 Although a full development of this idea lies beyond the scope of this article, one may see this as supporting 
Kant’s controversial claims concerning the ‘primacy of practical reason’ (KpV, 5:119f.) by revealing practical 
choice as reaching into the heart of Kant’s theoretical framework. 
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experience” (RGV, 6:62).36 Theoretical real possibility requires conformity “with the formal 
conditions of experience (in accordance with intuitions and concepts)” (KrV, A217/B265). An 
inability to prove such real possibility (either a priori or from experience) thus signals that our 
idea of a human to whom PO does not apply fails to accord with the formal conditions of 
experience.37 Theoretical reason or experience instead only presents this idea analogically (cf. 
RGV, 6:65n.), as a human being that is not overcome by the strongest temptations imaginable:  
We cannot think the ideal of a humanity pleasing to God (hence of such moral perfection 
as is possible to a being pertaining to this world and dependent on needs and inclinations) 
except in the idea of a human being willing not only to execute in person all human 
duties, (…) but also, though tempted by the greatest temptation, to take upon himself all 
sufferings, up to the most ignominious death, for the good of the world and even for his 
enemies. – For human beings cannot form for themselves any concept of the degree and 
the strength of a force like that of a moral disposition except by representing it 
surrounded by obstacles and yet – in the midst of the greatest possible temptation – 
victorious (RGV, 6:61, cf. 6:80-82; V-Mo/Collins, 27:441f.; V-Mo/Mron II, 29:604f.). 
The objective reality, i.e., the real possibility, of such an idea of the divine human being, can be 
established only “[f]rom the practical point of view” (RGV, 6:62). This is what we would expect 
if, as my reconstruction entails, the way we ought to be and therefore in some sense could have 
been is nonetheless incompatible with the a priori principles of possible experience.38 
 
36 See also the idea that “according to the cognition we have of the human being through experience, he cannot be 
judged otherwise [than as evil]” (RGV, 6:32, my emphasis). 
37 One could object that my account entails something stronger: That the concept of the divine human being lacks 
not just (theoretical) objective validity, but even logical consistency. If the divine human being takes part in the 
world of experience yet fails to accord with the conditions of possible experience, we must ascribe contradictory 
predicates to it. My response is to reiterate the importance of restricting the concept to practical rather than 
theoretical use: Theoretically asserting that the divine human being, qua divine, takes part in the world of experience 
– as the objection requires – is already an (illegitimate) determination of the concept according to the “schematism 
of object-determination” (RGV, 6:65n.). 
38 We can thereby also offer a speculative, yet perhaps still illuminating, answer to the often-expressed worry about 
the compatibility of universal evil with freedom: How can it be that we are free to choose between good and evil and 
yet somehow we all choose evil (see e.g. Grimm 2002: 163-164)? The proposed reconstruction suggests that while 





I have proposed a novel account of the missing “formal proof” of universal radical evil in Kant. 
The synthetic a priori element of this proof is the principle of intensive magnitude of KrV, which, 
when applied to our mental powers and their influence on our empirical power of choice 
(Willkür), leads to the conclusion that every man has his price: We are all subject to Possible 
Overpowering – the possibility of sensible inclinations overpowering moral demands so as to 
make us choose an immoral action.   
We are moreover culpable for making the initial choice of disposition that grounds Possible 
Overpowering as a synthetic a priori principle of the world of experience. From the practical 
point of view we can cognize a different possible human being, the divine human being, as an 
object of faith [Glauben] and as the prototype of humanity (RGV, 6:62). From the theoretical 
point of view, however, the “incomprehensibility of the union of this holiness with human 
sensible nature in the moral disposition” (RGV, 6:82) means that no theoretical cognition of our 
empirical character can be satisfactory or furnish sufficient proof of a human being without an 
evil propensity. 
Recent work on Kant has highlighted the underappreciated importance of causal powers 
(Watkins 2005), including for his empirical psychology (Frierson 2014). This article has argued 
that pursuing the causal power framework further helps shed new light on the persistent problem 
of universal radical evil. A key innovation, enabling this further development, is interpreting our 
freedom as able to influence the causal powers of the empirical mind. The proposed argument for 
universal radical evil reveals perhaps the most fundamental, radical consequence of how, for 
 
good people are, they are not – cannot be – here. (Of course, one should not ascribe “any worth or validity to such 
figments of the brain” (KrV, B417n.), beyond dispelling the semblance of a contradiction between freedom and the 
universality of evil.) Similarly, one may ask: If your form of cognition is sufficient for me to appear as evil, then 
how does my intelligible character contribute? How am I responsible, if your evil choice already ensures that all 
those who appear within experience must be radically evil? The answer is that your form of cognition isn't sufficient 
for me to appear as evil – since it isn't sufficient for me to appear at all. Only if I have chosen evil do I appear 
within possible experience, together with others who have made the same choice (how these choices coordinate to 
form the world of experience is beyond our knowledge). 
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Kant, our mental powers are grounded in freedom: A first principle of theoretical understanding, 
namely the principle of intensive magnitude, implies – in its application to our mental powers – 
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